Book Review: Modern Damages by Bishop, Joseph
REVIEWS
MODERN DAMAGES. Volume 1. By Melvin M. Belli. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-
Merrill Co., 1959. Pp. 1247. $22.50. Record album (3 discs), $15.00.
MELVIN BELLI blushingly styles himself The King of Torts, and so he it,
-or at least of the great province of that noble discipline which is concerned
with sudden death and maiming, "of most disastrous chances, of moving
accidents by flood and field."' Not for him such quaint, esoteric torts as
the wanton, reckless and wilful promulgation of an Accountitng Research
Bulletin on declining-balance depreciation.2 But within the field of personal
injury, which probably accounts for the bulk of tort litigation, Mr. Belli can
fairly claim to be the reigning monarch. His verdicts are the highest. and
so, presumably, are his fees; his publications, are the most voluminous; and, it
may be added, his publicity is the most flamboyant, in a field whose leading
practitioners are rarely shrinking violets.
Moreover, that field is a most important one. In addition to its enormous
social and economic significance, it is probably, along with criminal law, the
part of the law which impinges most directly on the consciousness of the
average citizen and by which that citizen tends to form his judgment of
law and lawyers. The problem of compensation for personal injury suffered
at another's hands is certainly among the oldest in jurisprudence; Honto
Neanderthalensis probably exercised his far from backward brain upon it
(for we know he had a well developed theology, which implies ideas on
ethics), and there is today no tribe of savages so primitive as to lack
definite ideas on the subject-and those ideas are often disconcertingly close
to the ones still prevalent in the most progressive and high-toned jurisdictions.
The one thing, in fact, on which there is nearly complete agreement among
plaintiffs' lawyers (including Mr. Belli), defendants' lawyers, and professors
is that our present system of compensation is antiquated, clumsy, expensive
and frequently unjust in its operation.3 The defects in our system of de-
termining appropriate damages for personal injury (leaving to one side, as
outside the scope of Modern Damages and therefore of this Review, the prob-
1. Othello act I, scene 3.
2. See Appalachian Power Co. v. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
177 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 268 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1959). This
pioneering effort to push back the frontier of the law of torts got short shrift from an
unimaginative judiciary.
3. See, e.g., James, The Columbia Study of Conpensation for Automobile Accidcnts:
An Unansered Challenge, 59 COLmiJ. L. RE%,. 408 (1959); Jones, Evaluation and
Settlement of a Personal Injury Damage Claim, 1959 INs. L.J. 559.
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lems incident to adjudicating liability in the first place) are numerous and
obvious; only the most salient need be mentioned.
1. Generally speaking, damages must be awarded once for all and in a
lump; the plaintiff must, within a comparatively short time after the accident
occurs, recover for all of his loss of earnings, medical expense and pain and
suffering-including those which he has yet to stiffer and may never suffer.
4
In many cases, of course, it is exceedingly difficult for doctors, let alone
jurors, to make such a forecast with even a semblance of accuracy, and the
difficulty is raised to the order of impossibility when it is required that this
conjectural decrease in income and increase in outgo be capitalized in con-
temporary dollars. Moreover, while the purpose of the award is, of course,
to put the victim in the same economic situation in which he would have
been if the accident had never occurred (with appropriate lagniappe for his
pain and suffering), the state of mind of the gratified recipient of a sudden
and substantial (or even stupendous) bundle of cash is often and regrettably
much less like that of a man who has traded future earnings for investment
cash than like that of a man who has just won the Irish Sweepstakes.5
2. The evaluation of damages is at best inexact and at worst capricious.
How can a jury or a judge calculate the effect of a broken nose on a spinster
plaintiff's chance of making a profitable marriage? What is the cash value
of a four-year-old to his parents? Of an amputated finger to an ambitious
but maybe untalented student of the violin? Should a widow who is an
overpowering cutie with a wide choice of rich second husbands receive lesser
damages for the wrongful death of a husband than a relict who is painfully
plain? It is hardly a matter for wonder that lay and judicial assessors wander-
ing in such a maze too frequently give weight to such extraneous but tangible
factors as the personality of the plaintiff or the picturesqueness of his injuries.
3. If it is possible to calculate medical expenses with some approach to
exactness and to make guesses at loss of earnings which are at least educated,
the intrinsic impossibility of pricing pain is such as to cause some commen-
tators simply to throw up their hands and propose that this element of
damages be abolished." The one yardstick which naturally suggests itself
to the juror--"what would I charge to suffer this pain myself ?"-is also,
4. Fetter v. Beale, 1 Raym. 339, 91 Eng. Rep. 1122 (K.B. 1699), aff'd sub non.
Ferrer v. Beale, 1 Raym. 602, 91 Eng. Rep. 1361 (K.B. 1702). The plaintiff collected
£11 for the defendant's tortious battery upon his skull. Thereafter, he developed alarm-
ing sequelae---"part of his skull by reason of the said battery came out of his head"-
and sought additional damages. The defendant successfully pleaded in bar the original
recovery, Chief Justice Holt remarking that when the case was originally tried before
him, "the plaintiff and defendant appeared to be both in drink, and the jury did not well
know which of them was in fault, and therefore they gave the less damages." One
wonders whether this important principle of the common law would be the same if
Fetter (or Ferrer) had been sober when his cranium was cracked.
5. See James, supra note 3, at 412; Jones, supra note 3, at 565-66.
"6. E.g., GREEN, TRAm1Ic VIcris-Toar LAW AND INsURAN E 88 (1958).
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as Mr. Belli points out,7 the one which the court firmly instructs him to
ignore. Yet damages for pain are often the largest component of an award."
4. As noted above, the sum handed a successful plaintiff in theory is sup-
posed to put him in the financial position he would have occupied if he had
suffered no injury. In fact, as Mr. Belli frankly recognizes, a third or a
half will normally go to pay his lawyer's contingent fee." Courts, of course,
shelter juries from such information as sternly as Victorian parents sheltered
children from sex. Fortunately, the juries (like the children) usually know
it anyhow and often take care of this item by inflating the rest of the damages;
it has been suggested that in practice "pain and suffering" is frequently a
term of art meaning "counsel fees."1 I intend no pharisaical reprobation
of the practice of charging such a substantial contingent fee. Given the
present system of awarding compensation, it seems to be about the only
way to assure competent representation of an impecunious plaintiff; "it can
hardly be said as a general proposition that counsel who conscientiously
satisfies himself of the merits before taking on an indigent plaintiff's case
on a contingent basis is necessarily any less ethical than counsel who vigor-
ously defends a clearly meritorious case because for so doing he is in receipt
of a fat fee from a wealthy defendant."" Whether a system of compensation
which entails such costs can and ought to be radically changed is, of course,
quite another question.
5. The upshot is that an award which fairly compensates a claimant for
his injuries, which is neither inadequate nor excessive, is so rare as to be
practically unheard of. The layman, morosely perusing the insurance company
propaganda which accompanies the annual notice that his liability insurance
premium has been raised again, develops a stereotype of an imbecile jury,
mesmerized by the baroque rhetoric of a wily ambulance chaser, lifting a
plausible malingerer to sudden affluence. There is some truth in the picture,
but probably not much. Mr. Belli, the Apostle of the Adequate Award, makes
out a persuasive case for the proposition that, at least in cases of serious injury
or death, the average award in most jurisdictions tends to be far too low.
More, he makes the surprising, but apparently accurate, assertion that juries
are habitually more niggardly than judges in making awards.12 On the other
hand, the undoubted rise in recent years in the cost of settling personal injury
claims (a rise which is too large to be accounted for merely by inflation)"2
7. Pp. 18-19.
8. See Morris, Liability for Pain and Suffering, 59 COLUM. L. Rfv. 476, 479-80
(1959).
9. P. 29.
10. See Mforris, supra note 8, at 477-78.
11. Angoff v. Goldfine, 270 F2d 185, 191 (Ist Cir. 1959).
12.' E.g., pp. 27, 33. Mr. Belli picks up somewhat unexpected support from a veteran
member of the defendants' bar, who estimates on the basis of the experience of one large
insurance company in the year 1958 that juries on the average give the plaintiff rather
less than a fourth of the sum he is demanding. See Jones, supra note 3, at 559-60.
. 13. See James, supra note 3, at 411.
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may in large measure be attributable to the fact that the comparatively trivial
injury is often grossly overcompensated-not so much by judges or juries as
by the insurance companies themselves, who, penny-wise and pound-foolish,
think to save litigation costs by compromising such claims without regard
to merit.
14
The subject matter of Modern Damages is therefore of vast importance,
and few men are better qualified by experience to discuss that subject than
is Mr. Belli. The more, then, is the pity that he has stuffed his opening
chapters with claptrap and composed much of them in a style which makes it
exceedingly hard to take his really valuable collection of data on damages as
seriously as it deserves to be taken.
Of the three chapters of the present volume, chapter I, "Modern Damages
in Perspective," is a disorganized editorial devoted to the general proposition
that damages for personal injuries ought to be higher than they are. Here
and there a nugget of worthwhile information gleams in the heap of dross-
for example, the report that some insurance companies now deal with the
problem of the future effects of plaintiff's injuries by handing him, along
with damages for what he has already suffered, a paid-up insurance policy
payable in the event that serious consequences actually develop. 16 But no
real attempt is made to discuss or even to describe alternatives to the present
system-possibly because Mr. Belli is personally very well satisfied with the
essentials of that system, provided only that something is done to increase
the size of awards. Specifically, Mr. Belli makes virtually no mention of the
principal suggestion for reforming the law of personal injury where it most
needs reform-the institution of some sort of Automobile Compensation Plan,
analogous to workmen's compensation. 16 Chapter II, "History of the Law of
Damages," is an ill-advised effort to give the humble Claimants' Compensation
Attorney (as he likes to call himself, in the manner of the Morticians, Real-
tors, Beauticians, etc., etc.) the illusion that he practices a profession which is not
merely useful but full of book learning, by presenting, in somewhat the style
of a Hearst Sunday supplement, a history and comparison of the law of torts
in different times and places. Leading off with a sonorous misquotation from
Shakespeare,' 7 Mr. Belli pays his respects, inter alia, to Hammurabi, Moses,
14. See Jones, supra note 3, at 563-64.
15. Pp. 32-33.
16. Mr. Belli's superficial allusion to the problem is at 26-27. For a concise but
informative treatment, see GRECoRY & KALVEN, ToRTs 743-83 (1959). Interest in such
reforms is not limited to professors. The State of Maine, which is not noted for rash
sociological experimentation, is seriously considering the creation of a state-administered
motor vehicle accident indemnity fund. See Opinion of the Justices, 155 Me. 125, 152
A.2d 494 (1959).
17. Mr. Belli's version, which he attributes simply to an inscription "which appears
above the entrance to the Archives Building in Washington," is "The past is but a
prologue to the future." P. 64. The actual text is "What is past is prologue," The
Tempest act II, scene 1, and it is in fact correctly quoted on the pedestal of one of the
heroic sculptures which adorn the National Archives Building-all of which Mr. Belli
[Vol, 69: 925
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Confucius, Ulpian, Justinian, Mohammed and the fathers of the Common
Law. It is probably impossible adequately to summarize this mass of juris-
prudence in eighty-three pages; certainly Mr. Belli has not done so. s ' More-
over, granted that Mr. Belli is a busy man, with no time for such pedantries
as proofreading or the employment of a dictionary, I cannot feel that the status
of law as a learned profession is enhanced by such astonishing phrases as
"appellate judicial circumcision of awards."'19
Chapter III, however, redeems the work. It is simply a state by state
tabulation of significantly high awards, many of them unreported elsewhere,
for wrongful death and various types of personal injury, accompanied both
by shrewd practical comments and by figures on judicial salaries and average
lawyers' incomes in the particular jurisdiction (although not, unfortunately,
the fees of counsel in the individual cases reported). As might be expected,
California (Belli's home ground) and New York set targets for the rest of
the nation to shoot at when it comes to adequacy of awards for personal
injury-for example, a California verdict of 85,000 dollars for two broken legs
and a broken cheekbone.2 0 The states of the late Confederacy lag badly, particu-
larly if the plaintiff is a Negro,21 but show signs of improvement. In some juris-
dictions at least, there seems to be an instructive correlation between the size
of awards and the size of judicial salaries. These are, of course, merely
examples; hundreds and maybe thousands of interesting conclusions can be
extracted or deduced from Mr. Beli's figures.
At the very least, his chapter III ought to be a Golconda of information,
comparable to Bowditch's Prartical Navigator, for the lawyer who wants to
know what his client ought to settle for, for the student or teacher of torts,
and for those who, like myself, merely find facts fascinating.2-  Mr Belli's
might have learned by the simple expedient of consulting Bartlett. These errors, which
of course are unimportant in themselves, are symptomatic of 'Ar. Belli's slapdash ap-
proach to legal writing.
18. Cf., e.g., the statement that "The Roman Legal System... disappeared in about
650 A.D." P. 94. This is assuredly one of the most summary dismissals ever accorded
the Byzantine Empire. In particular, it seems most unfair to the memory of Basil I,
the Macedonian, who, when not preoccupied with war or theology, turned his forceful
personality and considerable talents to the modernization and revivification of Justinian's
Code. See 1 VASILIEV, HIsTORY OF THE BYZANTlzE EmPias 339-43 (2d ed. 1958).
19. P. 30. I learn from my own dictionary and the King James version that the word
"circumcise," in addition to its primary meaning, has a secondary meaning, to purify
spiritually. E.g., Colossians 2:11. I doubt, however, that Air. Belli had in mind this
somewhat uncommon usage, for his dislike of remittitur makes it unlikely that he would
regard such circumscription of the jury's discretion as "spiritual purification."
20. P. 264.
21. P. 148.
22. I appreciate with peculiar keenness the practical value of Modern Damages, for,
as it happens, I was once myself a personal injury claimant and would have greatly
benefited from Air. Belli's vade inecum if I had had it. A massive marble table, negli-
gently installed by a landlord, lit on my great toe, with excruciating results. I w%-as at
the time associated with a corporation law firm which frequently handled private place-
1960]
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collection of cases-which Professor Harper's introduction justly terms "a
monumental piece of research" 2 3-is, so far as I know, unique. It goes far
toward meeting one of the major prerequisites to intelligent study and solution
of the problem of compensation for wrongful death or injury, in that it brings
up to date, and amplifies, some of the principal findings of the famous
Columbia Study of Compensation for Automobile Accidents of 1932.24 We
can look forward with keen interest to the publication of volume 2, which
will contain further tabulations.
A word or so ought to be said about the album of LP records which ac-
companies the volume and which preserves for posterity a selection of Mr.
Belli's more successful arguments to juries. On the strength of the first two
chapters of Modern Damages, I expected to hear some pretty perfervid
oratory-something along the line of the late 01' Gene Talmadge rousing a
rabble. I was completely wrong. Mr. Belli is an exponent of the soft sell,
and he does it brilliantly. His statements were reasonable, lucid and factual,
and they thoroughly persuaded me; only on a replaying did I pick up here
and there a subtle insertion of some fact not legally germane, but likely to
affect the jurors, such as incidental mention, in describing the background
of a tragedy, of decedent's membership in a large fraternal organization with
which some of the jurors probably had a connection. His voice was soft and
pleasing, but not soapily so; he cooed no more than he bellowed. The whole
tone was that of a highly competent teacher elucidating facts to a reasonably
bright class. It was an impressive performance, and the records might well
be a useful adjunct in teaching the art of advocacy.
JOSEPn W. Bisuop, JRi.t
ments for insurance companies, and the consensus of my colleagues was, roughly speak-
ing, that I'd be lucky if I collected fifty dollars; the most senior of the lot seemed to
think that if I didn't antagonize the landlord's insurer with the extortionate demand
that it pay my medical expenses, it might be willing to overlook the damage to the
table and the disturbance caused the landlord by my unseemly squawks of agony. Had
Mr. Belli's work then been published, I might have learned (p. 780) that in the juris-
diction in question $4,000, exclusive of loss of earnings, is regarded as "adequate" for
an identical injury.
23. P. vi.
24. See James, supra note 3, at 412.
tProfessor of Law, Yale Law School.
[Vol. 69: 925
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